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ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF CONTRACT APPEALS
H. CRANE MILLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the national budget has increased in recent years, so also has
government contracting. The Navy Department alone, spending close to
$8 billion in procurement annually, in a recent year entered into more
than 2Y2 million contracting actions. The items procured by the gov-
ernment are widely varied, from the bits and pieces by which it is
operated—paper clips and carbon paper—to highly technical and
sophisticated computers, aircraft, vessels and missiles.
Most of the problems that arise under the contracts will be
handled by negotiation between the contracting parties. Where dis-
putes do arise the government seeks to have work continue without
delay while the dispute is resolved, and both parties generally try to
resolve the dispute expeditiously and inexpensively. If negotiation has
not produced an agreement between the parties, administrative appeals
to the head of the department or agency, or to his duly authorized
representative, are provided in the standard "disputes clause.' In
fourteen government departments or agencies, boards have been es-
tablished to render final decisions or advisory opinions in contract
disputes. Other agencies make the decision by the head of the agency
the final administrative action of that agency.
* A.B., Williams College; LL.B. 1960, University of Virginia Law School; Attorney,
Office of the General Counsel, Department of the Navy.
The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do
not necessarily represent the views of the Office of the General Counsel, Department
of the Navy.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute concern-
ing a question of fact arising under this contract which is not disposed of by
agreement shall be decided by the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his
decision to writing and mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the
Contractor. The decision of the Contracting Officer shall be final and con-
clusive unless, within 30 days from, the date of receipt of such copy, the Con-
tractor mails or otherwise furnishes to the Contracting Officer a written appeal
addressed to the Secretary. The decision of the Secretary or his duly authorized
representative for the determination of such appeals shall he final and con-
clusive unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been
fraudulent, or capricious, or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily
to imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence. In connection
with any appeal proceeding under this clause, the Contractor shall be afforded
an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of his appeal.
Pending final decision of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor shall proceed
diligently with the performance of the contract and in accordance with the
Contracting Officer's decision.
(b) This "Disputes" clause does not preclude consideration of law questions
in connection with decisions provided for in paragraph (a) above; provided,
that nothing in this contract shall be construed as making final the decision
of any administrative official, representative, or board on a question of law.
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The authority of departments and agencies to resolve contro-
versies is limited by statute, judicial interpretation, or administrative
regulation, and in some matters it may be preferable to present a claim
to the General Accounting Office for adjudication. Also, where an
administrative determination of a contract dispute can be made by the
contracting agency, the contractor who is dissatisfied with the agency's
determination may present his claim to the General Accounting Office
for final settlement binding upon the executive agency. In addition, if
the contractor feels he has not received proper redress either by the
contracting agency or by the General Accounting Office, he may seek
judicial review in the Federal District Courts or in the Court of
Claims. In the area of judicial review the recently decided Bianchi
case2 has greatly enhanced the importance of administrative determina-
tion of contract disputes by limiting the scope of judicial review
generally to the administrative record. However, the position of the
Court of Claims, which prefers receipt of evidence de novo in the
judicial review of administrative decisions, may require further clarifi-
cation of the Supreme Court's intent in the Bianchi case.
This article is a basic exposition of the procedures for handling
contract disputes administratively, and of some of the problems con-
fronting the parties in judicial review of administrative decisions. Such
an exposition necessarily raises more questions than it purports to
answer, and this, I feel, is appropriate in any area as dynamic and
fluctuating as this one.
Administrative procedures for handling contract disputes have
caused considerable controversy over the years, and some proposals
have been made that would eliminate the finality of administrative
decisions. But only a surprisingly small number of questions ever
become contract disputes, and, of those disputes, a very small number
result in a judicial reversal of the administrative decision made in the
case. For instance, out of the millions of contracting actions entered
into by the military services since the beginning of World War II, the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals of the Department of
Defense, together with its predecessor military boards of contract
appeals, have been called upon to dispose of approximately 11,000
appeals since 1942. Of those, approximately 400, or three per cent,
were reviewed by the courts, and of those reviewed, roughly two-
thirds affirmed the decision of the boards. This is but one indication
that the administrative process has generally succeeded in accomplish-
ing its purpose.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The establishment of administrative boards to hear and decide
government contractors' claims against the United States appears
2 United States v. Bianchi, 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
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rooted in an ad hoc board created by the Secretary of War in 1861 to
examine and report on all unsettled claims arising out of certain con-
tracts under which payments had been suspended pending investiga-
tion of alleged fraud. In United States v. Adams,' a Board had been
created after a contract had been executed and the contractor sub-
mitted voluntarily to that Board in order to have his claim heard
quickly and to avoid the delay and expense of petitioning Congress or
litigating the issue before the Court of Claims. Ten years later, in
Kihlberg v. United States, 4
 the Supreme Court upheld a contract pro-
vision which made the determination of distances by an employee of
one of the contracting parties binding on them. This determination
governed the payment price for transportation services rendered under
the contract. The Court stated:
[I]t is sufficient that the parties expressly agreed that dis-
tances should be ascertained and fixed by the chief quarter-
master, and in the absence of fraud or such gross mistake as
would necessarily imply bad faith, or a failure to exercise
an honest judgment, his action in the premises is conclusive
upon the appellant as well as upon the government.'
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have reaffirmed this rule in con-
struing contract provisions which make an individual's decision final
and conclusive,' including contracts between private parties in which
it was provided that an employee of one of the parties was to be the
finder of fact in the event of a dispute between the parties.?
However, during the same period the Court of Claims at first fol-
lowed, then expanded the Kiklberg rule, by reversing administrative
decisions believed "lacking in impartiality" or having "no substantial
basis," from which that court implied bad faith.' In Needles v. United
States,' the Court of Claims stated:
[S]uch gross error will justify the court in upsetting the
8
 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 463 (1868).
4 97 U.S. 398 (1878).
5 Id. at 402.
° United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951) ; United States v. Moorman,
338 U.S. 457 (1950); United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730 (1944); United States v.
Callahan Walker Constr, Co,, 317 U.S. 56 (1942); Merrill-Ruckgaber Co. v. United
States, 241 U.S. 387, 393 (1916) ; Plumley v. United States, 226 U.S. 545, 547 (1913);
Ripley v. United States, 223 U.S. 695, 702, 704 (1912); United States v. Gleason, 175
U.S. 588, 602 (1900); Sweeney v. United States, 109 US. 618, 620 (1883).
7
 Chicago, Santa Fe & Cal. R.R. v. Price, 138 U.S. 185 (1891); Martinsburg &
Potomac R.R. v. March, 114 U.S. 549 (1885).
8 See, e.g., Penner Installation Corp. v. United States, 116 Ct. Cl. 550, 564, 86
F. Supp. 129, aff'd per curiam, 340 U.S. 898 (1950), rehearing denied, 340 U.S. 923
(1951) ; Mitchell Canneries, Inc. v. United States, Ill Ct. Cl. 228, 247, 77 F. Supp.
498 (1948) ; Loftis v. United States, 110 Ct. CI. 551, 630, 76 F. Supp. 816 (1948);
Bein v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 144, 166 (1943).
0 101 Ct. Cl. 535 (1944).
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decision if the extent of the gross error and the character
thereof is shown by proof of facts and circumstances known to
or available to the officer to have been inconsistent with good
faith—that is, wholly inconsistent with the kind of a decision
which a fair-minded person would have reached upon a
candid, reasonable, and impartial consideration of all the
known and available relevant facts and data.'
The court stated that unless a decision is "supported by substantial
evidence, it must be treated as having been arbitrary, capricious or so
grossly erroneous as to imply bad faith, and, therefore, lacking in
finality.'"' The reluctance of the Court of Claims to accord finality to
administrative records was stated in Volentine & Littleton v. United
States: 12
There is no statutory provision for these administrative de-
cisions or for any procedure in making them. The head of the
department may make the decision on appeal personally or
may entrust anyone else to make it for him. Whoever makes
it has no power to put witnesses under oath or to compel the
attendance of witnesses or the production of documents.
There may or may not be a transcript of the oral testimony.
The deciding officer may, and even in the departments main-
taining the most formal procedures, does,search out and con-
sult other documents which, it occurs to him, would be en-
lightening, and without regard to the presence or absence of
the claimant.
Further, the Court of Claims has held that under no circumstances
could questions of law be decided with finality pursuant to disputes
procedures."
The Supreme Court, however, has continued to give literal effect
to Disputes clauses. In United States v. Moorman'' the Court ex-
pressly refused to distinguish between the power to decide finally
questions of fact and of law, approving an "All-Disputes" article that
encompassed all disputes that might arise under the contract, in-
cluding determination as to what was "outside the requirements of the
contract."
1 '4 Id. at 606-07.
11 Wagner, Whirler & Derrick Corp, v. United States, 128 Ct. CI. 382, 121 F. Supp.
664 (1954).
12 136 Ct. Cl. 638, 642, 145 F. Supp. 952, 954 (1956). See also, Fehlhaber Corp.
v. United States, 138 Ct. Cl. 571, 151 F. Supp. 817, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 877 (1957).
13 Edwards Eng'r Corp. v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 218-59 (April 15, 1963);
Beacon Constr. Co. v. United States, 314 F.2d 501 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Guyler v. United
States, 314 F.2d 506 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Callahan Constr. Co. v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl.
538, 616 (1940); McShain v. United States, 88 Ct. Cl. 284, rev'd per curiam, 308 U.S.
512, amended, 308 U.S. 520 (1939).
14 338 U.S. 457, 463 (1950).
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Shortly thereafter, in United States v. Wunderlich," the Supreme
Court temporarily halted the expansion of judicial review of adminis-
trative decisions, upholding "the finality of the department head's
decision unless it was founded on fraud, alleged and proved."" The
Court explained:
So fraud is in essence the exception. By fraud we mean con-
scious wrongdoing, an intention to cheat or be dishonest.
The decision of the department head, absent fraudulent
conduct, must stand under the plain meaning of the con-
tract."
In the controversy following the Wunderlich case, remedial
legislation was enacted in the Act of May 11, 1954, 18
 the so-called
"Wunderlich Act," which established standards of judicial review of
administrative decisions similar, although not necessarily following,
those developed by the Court of Claims prior to the
. 
Supreme Court's
decision in Wunderlich. The Act provides:
1. No provision of any contract entered into by the United
States, relating to the finality or conclusiveness of any de-
cision of the head of any department or agency or his duly
authorized representative or board in a dispute involving a
question arising under such contract shall be pleaded in any
suit now filed or to be filed as limiting judicial review of any
such decision to cases where fraud by such official or his said
representative or board is alleged: Provided, however, That
any such decision shall be final and conclusive unless the
same is fradulent [sic] 14 or capricious or arbitrary or so
grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not
supported by substantial evidence.
2. No Government contract shall contain a provision making
final on a question of law the decision of any administrative
official, representative, or board.
The House Judiciary Committee report' on the Wunderlich legis-
lation stated that it understood "substantial evidence" to mean that
test established by the Supreme Court in Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB,' wherein "substantial evidence" was defined as "such relevant
15 342 US. 98 (1951).
16 Id. at 100.
17 Ibid.
Is 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. § 321-322 (1958).
19
 Legal precision stuffily perpetuates the misspelling of this word as it appears
in the original. Possibly it should read "froadulent."
20 H.R. Rep. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1954).
21 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
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evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion!'" In the same report, the Committee further commented:
It has been brought to light in public hearings that it is the
exception rather than the rule that contractors in the pre-
sentation of their disputes are afforded an opportunity to
become acquainted -with the evidence in support of the
Government's position. It is believed that if the standard of
substantial evidence is adopted this condition will be cor-
rected and that the records of hearing officers will here-
after contain all of the testimony and evidence upon which
they have relied in making their decisions. It would not be
possible to justify the retention of the finality clauses in
Government contracts unless the hearing procedures were
conducted in such a way as to require each party to present
openly its side of the controversy and afford an opportunity
of rebutta1.23
Volentine & Littleton' was the first court decision, after en-
actment of the Wunderlich Act, that held that that Act did not proscribe
the court's receipt of de novo evidence in review of administra-
tive decisions. Shortly thereafter, a conflict arose when Federal Dis-
trict Courts and Courts of Appeals uniformly concluded that the
court must confine its review to the administrative record, and new
evidence could not be introduced, on the issue of substantial evidence,
to reverse an administrative determination of fact, 21
III. SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING
CONTRACT DISPUTES
An informal survey of government agencies and departments,
conducted by the author, revealed that there are presently fourteen
administrative tribunals established to hear and consider contract
appeals.2a The Department of State, which has no formal procedure
22 Id. at 229.
23 Supra note 20, at 5.
24 Supra note 12.
25 Allied Paint & Color Works, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir.
1962) ; Wells & Wells, Inc. v. United States, 269 F.2d 412, 415 (8th Cir. 1959); M.
Berger Co. v. United States, 199 F. Supp, 22, 26 (W.D. Pa. 1961); United States v.
Hamden Co-operative Creamery Co., 185 F. Supp. 541, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd,
297 F,2d 130 (2d Cir. 1961) ; United States Nat'l Bank of Portland v. United States,
178 F. Supp. 910, 912 (D. Ore. 1959); Mann Chemical Labs., Inc. v. United States,
174 F. Supp. 563, 565-66 (D, Mass. 1958).
zo (1) Department of Defense, ASBCA, Rules of Practice, 32 C.F.R. 30.1 (Supp.
1963), as amended, 28 Fed. Reg. 9348-51 (1963).
(2) Army Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals, Rules of Practice, 33
C.F.R.	 210.4 (1962).
(3) Department of the Interior Board of Contract Appeals, Rules of Practice,
43 C.F.R. 11 4.1-.16 (Supp. 1963).
116
 OLLE  I  I   
.' In the same report, the Commit e  further co e t :
 i ted it  t   t
 t  t ti  a  evidence upon hich
 bu tal."
 olentine  i tleto '
 t t
,  t  iss e f substantial evidence,
 i istrative determination of fact."
I . SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR HANDLIN
I
ls. ° The Department of State, hich has no f r l r
 Id. at 2
2 Supra ote 2 , 
 Supra te .
 li  ai t  l r rks, Inc. v. nited States, 3  .  13 ,  (  i
; el s & el s, Inc. v. it .  , 15 (8th Cir. 1959); .
tapp. 22, 26 ( . . Pa. 1961); nited States v.
 - perative rea er ., . . . . . 
.  i . ; nite  t t s rtl  v. nited States,
. . re. 1959);  e ical ., c. . ite  States,
. , -  ( . ass. 1958).
22 f efe s , , les of ractice, 32 C.F.R. $ 30.1 (S .
,  e . eg. -  ( ).
gi f tract eal , l
	
t f the Interior Board of Contract A peals, Rules of Practice,
. . §$ .
ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL APPEALS
for handling contract disputes, but has dealt with them in the past on
an ad hoc basis, is understood to be preparing to establish a board of
contract appeals modelled after other boards which have authority to
render final decisions in contract appeals. In some agencies, boards are
not established because there is an insufficient volume of contracts to
warrant such a board. The Small Business Administration, the National
Science Foundation, the United States Information Agency and the
Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation are among such
agencies. The National Science Foundation and the United States
Information Agency have made arrangements with the Armed Serv-
ices Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) to have cases referred to
the ASBCA for findings and recommendations, usually subject to
final decision by the head of the agency. In the Tennessee Valley
Authority, while the three-man Board of Directors has delegated
authority to the Head of the Purchasing Division to make initial de-
cisions, the final decision, on appeal, is made by the General Manager.
Similarly, contract appeals are referred to the head of the agency in
the National Mediation Board and the District of Columbia Re-
development Land Agency. The Department of Health, Education and
Welfare is in the process of establishing procedures, but presently
handles contract appeals by appointment of an ad hoc board by the
Administrative Assistant Secretary, for report and recommendations
to him for final decision. Likewise, the Coast Guard Board of Con-
tract Appeals, while having published rules, renders only an advisory
opinion, final decision being made by The Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury. The Maritime Administration uses a hearing examiner who
(4) Post Office Department Board of Contract Appeals, Rules of Practice, 39
C.F.R. §§ 201.101-.121 (1962).
(5) General Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals, Rules of Prac-
tice, 41 C.F.R. § 5-60.2 (1963), as amended, 28 Fed. Reg. 1770, 28 Fed. Reg. 11689
(1963).
(6) Atomic Energy Commission, Rules of Procedure, 10 C.F.R. §§ 2,400-2.440,
2,700-2.780 (1963).
(7) Department of Agriculture, Contract Disputes Board, Commodity Credit Cor-
poration, 6 C.F.R. § 400 (1963).
(8) Department of Agriculture, Procurement Board, Rules of Practice, 7 C.F.R.
§§ 1.101-.106 (Supp. 1963).
(9) National Aeronautics & Space Administration Board of Contract Appeals,
Rules of Practice, 14 C.F.R. §§ 1209.100-1209.303 (1963).
(10) Veterans' Administration Contract Appeals Board, Rules of Practice, 38
C.F.R. §§ 1.750-.756 (Supp. 1963).
(11) Agency for International Development Board of Contract Appeals, Rules of
Practice, 27 Fed. Reg. 891; Charter, 27 Fed. Reg. 903 (1962).
(12) Federal Aviation Agency Contract Appeals Panel, Rules of Practice, 41
C.F.R. § 2-60 (1963), as amended, 28 Fed. Reg. 6268 (1963).
(I3) Department of Commerce Appeals Board—No Rules of Practice.
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makes a report and recommendation to either the Subsidy Board or
the Administrator for final decision..
Hearings before the enumerated tribunals, and before the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare, the Maritime Administra-
tion, appeals of the United States Information Agency and the National
Science Foundation which are handled by the ASBCA, and the pro-
posed State Department Board are adversary hearings. Ex parte pro-
ceedings or presentations are held before the National Mediation
Board, the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency and the
Tennessee Valley Authority.
Adversary proceedings before administrative tribunals are quite
similar, informally following the procedures used in non-jury federal
civil trials. Pleadings, briefs, depositions, some motions prior to hear-
ing, oral examination and cross-examination, prehearing conferences
and motions for reconsideration are generally available to the parties.
Most board decisions are final, except, as previously noted, those of
the Coast Guard, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
the Maritime Administration and decisions by the ASBCA for the
National Science Foundation and the United States Information
Agency.
IV. PROCEDURES OF THE ASBCA AND THE AEC
Below is a summary of the contract appeals procedures of two
agencies, those of the Department of Defense's Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) and of the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion. The rules of the ASBCA are generally representative of the
rules and methods of handling contract appeals in most departments
and agencies providing appeals from contracting officers' final decisions.
By way of comparison, the AEC employs a unique procedure modelled
after the Administrative Procedure Act, providing for hearing ex-
aminers to hear, consider and make initial decisions of contract ap-
peals. The two procedures are summarized here in order to compare
two methods for handling similar problems.
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
Charter. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals has been
designated as the authorized representative of the Secretary of Defense
and the three service Secretaries "in hearing, considering and deter-
mining, as fully and finally as might each of the Secretaries," appeals
by contractors from decisions of contracting officers or their au-
thorized representatives or other authorities on disputed questions."
While most appeals will be from decisions of contracting officers, the
27 ASBCA, 32 C.F.R. § 30.1, Part II (Supp. 1963), as amended, 28 Fed. Reg. 9348.
(1963).
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ASBCA is authorized to hear appeals taken pursuant to the provisions
of any directive whereby a right of appeal not contained in the contract
has been granted by one of the Secretaries." The Board's Charter pro-
vides that "[W]hen an appeal is taken pursuant to a disputes clause in
a contract which limits appeals to disputes concerning questions of fact,
the Board may in its discretion hear, consider, and decide all questions
of law necessary for the complete adjudication of the issue."n Where
the claim is not cognizable under the terms of the contract, such as for
breach of contract, 3° for unliquidated damages' or equitable relief, 82
the Board may make findings of fact with respect to the claim without
expressing an opinion on the question of liability."
Rules
(1) Notice of Appeal. The disputes procedure presupposes that
a dispute has arisen between the contracting officer and the contractor
which they,have not been able to resolve by agreement. In such a case,
the contracting officer must make a final decision, giving the con-
tractor notice that it is final and alerting him to his contractual right
to appeal the decision." Under new rules made effective on August 1,
1963, the contractor must file a notice of appeal within the time
specified in the contract or allowed by applicable provision of direc-
tive or of law." The notice of appeal should indicate that an appeal is
intended, should identify the contract, the cognizant department, bu-
reau or office and the decision from which the appeal is taken." Board
rules require that the contracting officer forward the notice of appeal
to the Board within ten days of receipt," with the complaint, if one
is filed with the notice of appeal. In advising the contractor that his
appeal has been docketed, the Board sends a copy of its rules.
(2) Complaint. A complaint ". . . setting forth simple, concise
and direct statements of each of his claims, alleging the basis, with
appropriate reference to contract provisions, for each claim, and the
dollar amount claimed . . ." must be filed within thirty days of re-
ceipt of notice of the docketing of the appeal by the Board." "This
pleading shall fulfill the generally recognized requirements of a corn-
28 Id. at g 30.1(I)(b).
29
 Supra note 27.
30
 E.g., Rosenthal & Son, Inc., A,S.B.C.A. No. 7833, 61-2 B.C.A. If 3150 (1961).
See note 136, infra.
31 See note 137, infra.
32 Murray-Sanders & Associates, A.S.B.C.A. NOs. 6725, 6941, 7030, 61-1 B.C.A.
11 2981 (1961); see note 135, infra.
33 Supra note 27.
34 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 1.314 (Supp. 1963).
35 ASBCA (Rule 1), 28 Fed. Reg. 9347 (1963).
ao ASBCA (Rule 2), id. at 9349.
a7 ASBCA (Rule 3), id. at 9349.
38 ASBCA (Rule 6[a]), id. at 9349.
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plaint, although no particular form or formality is required!" 30 The
new rules give the Board discretion to treat the notice of appeal as the
complaint, if the complaint is not received within thirty days, and if, in
the Board's opinion, the issues before the Board are sufficiently
defined."
(3) Answer. Counsel for the government must prepare its
answer within thirty days after service of the complaint. The answer,
like the complaint, shall set forth simple, concise and direct state-
ments of the government's defense to each claim asserted by the
contractor and fulfill the generally recognized requirements of an
answer." The rules provide that defenses which go to the jurisdiction
of the Board may be included in the answer or raised on rnotion."
Under the old Board rules, the government would file documents
enumerated below when it filed its answer. The new rules require sub-
mission to the Board by the contracting officer within thirty days after
receipt of a notice of appeal, the findings of fact and the decision from
which the appeal was taken, documents of claim in response to which
the decision was issued, the contract, pertinent plans, specifications,
amendments, change orders, correspondence between the parties perti-
nent to the appeal, transcripts of any testimony taken during the course
of proceedings and such additional information as may be considered
material."
(4) Motions. Provision is made for motions to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction which may be heard and determined before oral
hearing on the merits, upon application of either party, unless the
Board defers determination pending oral hearing on the merits and
the motion."
(5) Prehearing Procedures. Prehearing procedures available in
appeals before the Board include taking depositiQns," service of
written interrogatories on the opposing party,' orders to produce and
permit inspection of designated documents,' requests for admission of
specified facts 48 and prehearing conferences."
(6) Depositions. Depositions are not taken in accordance with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," but according to the Board's
rules as stated in Rule 14. Either party may take the deposition of any
39 Ibid.
40 ibid .
41 ASBCA (Rule 6[111), id. at 9349.
42 Ibid. See also ASBCA (Rule 5), id. at 9349.
43 ASBCA (Rule 4), id. at 9349.
44 ASBCA (Rule 5), id. at 9349.
45 ASBCA (Rule 14), id. at 9350.




ASBCA (Rule 10), id. at 9350.
5° Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.
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person after an appeal has been docketed by the Board." The new rules
make express what was informally understood previously, that is, leave
to take depositions will not ordinarily be granted unless the deponent
cannot appear at the hearing or unless a hearing is waived." The deposi-
tion is taken under oath, either upon written interrogatories or upon
oral examination." The deposition is not an instrument of pre-trial dis-
covery in appeals before the ASBCA. If the deposition is upon written
interrogatories, cross-interrogatories may be served upon the party
proposing to take the deposition within fifteen days after service of
the interrogatories. 54
 If it is upon oral examination, fifteen days writ-
ten notice of the time and place of taking, and the name and address
of the witness and the person before whom it is proposed to take the
deposition is required."
Applications for service of written interrogatories, inspection of
documents and admission of specified facts will not be permitted by
the Board as a matter of course, but such applications will be approved
only if they are, in the Board's determination, consistent with the
securing of just and inexpensive determination of appeals without
unnecessary delay.' Note that the Board's rules permit discovery only
of "designated documents." 57
 Unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure," the applicant for discovery must designate the documents he
wishes to inspect and show that those documents have materiality and
relevancy to the issues of.the appeal."
(7) Prehearing Conferences. The Board may, in its discretion,
•on its own or upon application of one of the parties, call for a pre-
hearing conference to consider (1) simplifying issues; (2) stipulation
of facts and of documents; (3) limitation of number of expert wit-
nesses; (4) the possibility of agreements disposing of all or any of the
issues in dispute; and (5) anything else to aid disposition of the ap-
peal. After such a conference the presiding Board member reduces the
results of the conference to writing in the presence of the parties, which
writing constitutes a part of the record."
(8) Optional Accelerated Procedure. In keeping with the
Board's desire for expeditious and informal handling of contract ap-
peals, the Board permits the contractor to choose an optional acceler-
51 ASBCA (Rule 141a]), 28 Fed. Reg. 9350 (1963).
52 Ibid.
55 ASBCA (Rule 14[c]-rep, id. at 9350.
64
 ASBCA (Rule 14[(1]), id. at 9350.
55 ASBCA (Rule 14[c]), id. at 9350.
59
 ASBCA (Rule 15), id. at 9350.
" Ibid.
59
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
59 Cuneo, Development of the Administrative Record, 1 Gov't Contracts Rev. 12
(1957).
69 ASBCA (Rule 10), , 28 Fed. Reg. 9350 (1963).
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ated procedure in appeals amounting to $5,000 or less. 61 Such appeals
are handled on an expedited basis, without regard to their normal
position on the docket. The parties may elect to waive pleadings, to
waive a hearing, or both, and submit the appeal on the record; but in
all other respects the Board's rules apply to the proceedings."
(9) Hearings. Hearings before the Board are normally held in
Washington, but may be held at other locations." Provision is made for
submission of a party's case upon the Board record without a hearing."
If so submitted, the record may be supplemented by oral argument, by
briefs or both. Ordinarily, simultaneous briefs will be submitted within
twenty days after receipt of the transcript of any hearing that is
transcribed, or such other terms as agreed upon by the parties and
the presiding member.65
 However, unexcused absence of a party at a
' hearing will not cause delay, and the hearing will proceed without
the absent party, whose case will be regarded as submitted."
Hearings are informally conducted, generally before a single
member of the Board. A verbatim transcript of the proceedings is
taken by a court stenographer." Witnesses testify under oath or
affirmation, unless the facts are stipulated." Evidence is generally ad-
missible under rules of evidence applied in courts of the United States
in non-jury trials, but is subject to the "sound discretion" of the pre-
siding member in supervising the extent and manner of presentation B 9
Admissibility generally hinges on "relevancy and materiality.”" The
weight to be attached to the evidence presented in any particular form
will be in the discretion of the Board.' Stipulations of fact and stipu=
lated testimony of absent witnesses may be regarded and used as
evidence at the hearing." The hearings are as informal as may be
"reasonable and appropriate" under the circumstances.
(10) Decisions. Decisions of the Board are in writing, based
solely on the Board record, and authenticated copies are sent to the
parties." While a hearing will usually be conducted before one member
of the Board, three members, called a division,. will decide the case.
The decision of a majority of the division constitutes the decision of
61 ASBCA (Rule 12), id. at 9350.
02 Ibid.
ASBCA (Rule 17), id. at 9350.
04 ASBCA (Rule 11), id. at 9350.
05 ASBCA (Rule 23), id. at 9351.
00 ASBCA (Rule 19), id. at 9350.
67 ASBCA (Rule 24), id. at 9351.
68 ASBCA (Rule 21), id. at 9350.




73 ASBCA (Rule 28), id. at 9351.
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the Board, provided that the Chairman and two Vice Chairmen
jointly signify their approval of the decision.
Atomic Energy.Commission
The Atomic Energy Commission provides unique procedures for
the handling of contractors' appeals, which couple speed in making
decisions with the formality of the Administrative Procedure Act. 74
Since 1959 the AEC has used hearing examiners, qualified under Sec-
tion 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act, in deciding contractors'
appeals. While encouraging informal procedures," the Commission's
rules governing procedures in all adjudications initiated by a notice of
appeal provide a higher degree of formality than those of the ASBCA.
The Commission's preliminary proceedings are similar to those
of the ASBCA, an appeal from a contracting officer's decision being
initiated by serving a notice of appeal upon the contracting officer
within thirty days after service of the contracting officer's decision."
The contents of the notice of appeal are similar, to those required
for appeals to the ASBCA. 77 .A complaint can either be filed with the
notice of appeal, or within twenty days of service of the notice of ap-
peal on the contracting officer," and must identify the contract, set
forth the text of contract articles in dispute, identify other contract
articles relevant to the dispute, identify the decision from which the
appeal is taken and specify the allegedly erroneous portions of the
decisions, with a brief statement of the grounds of the appeal."
The contracting officer prepares a file similar to that required by
the ASBCA," which, however, he must file with the Secretary of the
Atomic Energy Commission within twenty days (unless extended)
after service of the complaint. The answer shall admit or deny each
material allegation, allege any matters of fact or law constituting a
complete or partial defense, state affirmative defenses separately and
may assert in the answer, or on motion, lack of jurisdiction or failure to
state a claim on which relief can be granted.' Pleadings may be
amended,' the complaint may be dismissed 83 or a decision may be
made by the hearing examiner without a hearing." However, a hearing
may be demanded by any party, or ordered by the hearing examiner,
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hearing date." The hearing itself is conducted as a trial de novo of
relevant issues of fact and law, the party making a claim generally
having the burden of proof.86
The Commission's procedures differ markedly from those of
most boards of contract appeals in that (1) subcontractors are per-
mitted a direct appeal to the Commission," (2) persons whose interests
may be affected by a proceeding are permitted to file a petition for
leave to intervene, 88 (3) subpoenas may be issued requiring the attend-
ance and testimony of witnesses or the production of evidence" and
(4) the initial decision of the presiding officer is final thirty days after
its date, unless within twenty days of its date a party files a petition
for review, or the Commission directs that the record be certified to
it for final decision." On such review, the Commission may take into
consideration (1) the propriety of the award on its face or the size
of the award, (2) compliance by the contractor, contracting officer and
hearing examiner with the requirements of law and of the contract and
(3) substantial and important questions of law, policy or discretion
presented by the record, in determining whether it will grant the
appeal.'
Commentary
(a) Decisions. The AEC has formal, yet expeditious, pro-
cedures in the consideration and determination of contract appeals.
Of particular note in the goal to achieve expeditious disposition of con-
tract appeals is the Commission's provision for a single hearing ex-
aminer to hear, consider and determine such appeals; his decision to
be final within thirty days, subject only to certification to the Com-
mission for review. Under the ASBCA's present division system the
presiding member hearing or considering an appeal will write his
decision, based upon the Board record, The whole record and the
proposed decision are then reviewed by a majority of the members of
the same division, who concur or dissent. The decision of a majority
of the division constitutes the decision of the Board provided that
the chairman and two vice-chairmen jointly signify their approval of
the decision.
To the extent that review of the initial decision may be deemed
necessary, the present review by the chairman and two vice-chairmen
of the ASBCA appears adequate, without the intervening and time-
85 10 C.F.R, § 2.430 (1963).
86 10 C.F.R. § 2.431 (1963).
87 10 C.F.R. § 2.401(a) (1963) defines "contractor" as including subcontractors.
88 10 C.F.R. § 2.401(C)(3) (1963).
80 68 Stat. 948
eo 10 C.F.R. §
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consuming step of review by other members of a division. The members
of the Board are generally trial lawyers with considerable experience in
military procurement. Their experience and skill, coupled with the
need for expeditious handling of appeals, warrant reposing in the
individual members the responsibility for making Board decisions,
subject to review only by the Board chairman and vice-chairmen, and
eto reconsideration by the whole Board upon proper motion, as pro-
vided by the present rules.
(b) Subcontractors' Appeals. Whereas the AEC rules permit a
direct appeal to the AEC by subcontractors, Section 3-903.5 of the
Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) provides that con-
tracting officers should not consent to subcontract clauses purporting
to give a subcontractor a direct right to appeal to the ASBCA. The
rationale of this position is that the government is entitled to the prime
contractor's management services in adjusting disputes between the
prime contractor and his subcontractors. However, he can approve a
clause permitting the subcontractor to 'appeal indirectly to the ASBCA
(i) by asserting the prime contractor's right to take such an appeal
or (ii) by having the prime contractor prosecute such an appeal on
behalf of the subcontractor. Note that the government will only agree
to be obligated to decide disputes arising between the government and
the prime contractor, cognizable under the "disputes" clause, and
will not be obligated to deal directly with the subcontractor. The
contractor and subcontractor may agree to settle their disputes by
arbitration. However, the results and costs resulting from arbitration
are not binding upon the contracting officer, but are subject to inde-
pendent review and approval under the prime contract.
(c) Subpoenas. By statute, any head of a department or
bureau in which a claim against the United States is properly pending
may apply to any judge or clerk of any United States court to issue a
subpoena for the appearance of any witness within the jurisdiction
of that court. The procedure involved is administratively cumbersome,
limited and infrequently used by the government. However, in two
unrelated pending contract appeals by the same company, the one
before the Department of Interior Board of Contract Appeals and the
other before the ASBCA, the government has invoked the authority
under that statute' in applying to two District Courts for subpoenas.
92 Rev. Stat. § 184 (1875), 5 U.S.C. § 94 (1958). A subpoena ad testificandum
was issued in the one case, Appeal of Merritt-Chapman & Scott, Inc., Department of
Interior Board of Contract Appeals No. 365, and a subpoena duces tecum in the other,
Appeal of Merritt-Chapman & Scott, Inc., A.S.B.C.A. No. 8293. The statute does not
expressly provide for a subpoena of documents and records, and the question might
be raised whether the power granted a department head to apply for a subpoena for
a witness should be extended by the District Court to include any subpoena that could
be issued by the court under Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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V. REMEDIES OF CONTRACTORS BEFORE THE
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
The standard "disputes" clause provides only for an appeal of
a contract dispute to the head of the department or his duly' auth-
orized representative. However, the General Accounting Office, act-
ing under the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921," has authority
to settle, compromise and adjust "all claims and demands whatever*
by the Government of the United States or against it, and all accounts
whatever in which the Government of the United States is concerned,
either as debtor or creditor. . . ."° 4
Certain claims against the United States are adjudicated by
the Claims Division of the General Accounting Office, including:
(1) claims which involve doubtful questions of law or fact, except
those which have been the subject of an advance Comptroller General
decision," (2) all claims required by statute, Comptroller General
regulation or decision to be settled in the General Accounting Office
before payment is made" and (3) claims which appear to be barred by
the statute of limitations when received by an administrative agency."
There are several factors to be considered before deciding
whether to file suit in a court, appeal administratively or to present
a claim to the Comptroller General. If a decision on a matter has
been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, the General Ac-
counting Office will not consider a contractor's claim." However, if
a contractor's claim is refused by the General Accounting Office, he
is not precluded from seeking judicial relief" if the six-year statute
of limitations for filing suit against the United States has not
passed.'" Claims may be filed in the General Accounting Office up
to ten years after a cause of action arises."'
Submission of Claims to the General Accounting Office
Claimants against the United States generally receive more ex-
peditious determination if their claims are filed initially with the ad-
ministrative department or agency out of whose activities they
93 42 Stat. 20 (1921), 31 U.S.C.	 71, 471, 581, 581a (1958).
04 42 Stat. 24 (1921), 31 U.S.C.	 71 (1958). See also General Accounting Office,
Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies (herein cited G.A.O.).
95 4 G.A.O. 2015.10(1) (1958).
96 4 G.A.O. 2015.10(2) (1958). •
97 4 G.A.O. 2015.10(4) (1958).
es 30 Decs. Comp. Gen. 178 (1950).
99 Belcher v. United States, 94 Ct. Cl. 137 (1941); McCabe v. United States, 84
Ct. Cl. 291, 293 (1936).
100 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401, 2501 (1958); Cosmopolitan Mfg. Co. v. United States,
297 F.2d 546 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Fattore v. United States, 312 F.2d 797 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
101 54 Stat. 1061 (1940), 31 U.S.C. § 71(a) (1958).
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arose,102
 for the preparation of an administrative report. 103
 However,
if the ten-year statutory period of limitation will soon expire, claims
should be submitted directly to the Claims Division of the General
Accounting Office."'
Should a contractor and an administrative agency together sub-
mit a controversy to the General Accounting Office for settlement,
the decision of the Comptroller General may not be redetermined
by the ASBCAl" unless the Board reacquires jurisdiction to deter-
mine questions of fact through referral of the case to the department
for decision and appeal under the "disputes" clause.'" The ABSCA
has further decided that contractors' rights under the "disputes" clause
are not lost when a department unilaterally submits a contractor's
appeal to the General Accounting Office."' However, a final settlement
by the General Accounting Office is final and conclusive upon the de-
partment, and after such settlement the contractor may bring immediate
suit in the Court of Claims without awaiting further administrative
decision by the department.'"
While no particular form is required for submitting claims to
the Claims Division of the General Accounting Office, the claim must
be in writing and signed by the claimant or his authorized agent or
attorney.'" Claims are settled on the basis of the facts as established
by the government agency concerned and by evidence submitted by
the claimant.110
 Absent evidence sufficiently convincing to overcome
a presumption of correctness, when there is a conflict between the
assertion of the claimant and the findings of the administrative
agency concerned, the General Accounting Office's established rule
is to accept as fact the report of the agency. 111 Settlements are based
on a written record only and founded on a determination of the United
States' legal liability under the factual situation as established by
the written record. 112 The claimant has the burden of establishing
his right to payment and to establish the liability of the United
102 4 G.A.O. 2020.30 (1958).
1°3 4 G.A.O. 2030.20 (1958).
104 4 G.A.O. 2025.10 (1958).
1°5
 Brooks Callaway Co. v. United States, 97 Ct. Cl. 689, 704 (1942), rev'd, 318
U.S. 120 (1943); Global Van Lines, A.S.B.C.A. No. 5714, 60-1 B.C.A. ¶ 2498 (1960);
Gainesville Scrap Iron & Metal Co., A.S.B.C.A. No. 3460, 57-1 B.C.A. If 1274 (1957);
IT. P. Andrews Paper Co., A.S.B.C.A. No. 2486 (1955).
100
 Cornelia Garment Co., A.S.B.C.A. No. 1673 (1954); Woodcraft Corp., A.S.B.C.A.
No. 2660 (1955).
1°T Woodcraft Corp., A.S.B.C.A. No. 2660 (1955); Kenmore Window Cleaning Co.,
A.S.B.C.A. No. 5877, 60-1 B.C.A. 2658 (1960).
1" Brooks Callaway Co., supra note 105. See 4 G.A.O. 2030.50, 2050.40 (1958).
109 4 G.A.O. 2020.10 (1958).
'no 4 G.A.O. 2040.10 (1958).
all 37 Decs. Comp. Gen. 568 (1958).
112 4 G.A.O. 2040.10 (1958).
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States.'" The General Accounting Office has no formal hearing pro-
cedure or requirement," 4 and while informal oral interviews are gen-
erally granted," 5 any additional evidence must be submitted in
writing."8 Settlements made by the Claims Division are final and con-
clusive upon the executive branch of the government unless revised
by or at the direction of the Comptroller General,'"
Settlements made by the Claims Division will be reviewed (1)
in the discretion of the Comptroller General upon the written appli-
cation of (a) a claimant whose claim has been settled or (b) the head
of the department or government establishment to which the claim
or account relates, or (2) upon motion of the Comptroller General
at any time.118 Applications for review of claim settlements should
state the errors that the applicant believes have been made in the
settlement and which form the basis of his request for reconsider-
ation.'"
Review of Administrative Decisions
On occasion the General Accounting Office asserts authority to
review the decisions of boards of contract appeals, 12° stating that
neither the Senate nor House Committees on the Judiciary intended,
by the Wunderlich legislation, to enlarge or restrict the jurisdiction
of the General Accounting Office, but recognized the jurisdiction that
that Office already had."' However, the Comptroller General does not
consider that he has a right to disturb such a decision unless it is
"fraudulent, capricious, arbitrary, so grossly erroneous as necessarily
to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence."'
The Comptroller General's review will be limited to the record before
the Board. 123
Where the contractor has failed to pursue his remedies under the
"disputes" clause, the General Accounting Office will not consider a
contractor's claim, 124 unless the General Accounting Office decides
113 Ibid.
114 21 Decs. Comp. Gen. 244 (1941).
115 Staff of Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., A
Primer on Government Contract Claims, p. 5 (Comm. Print 1961).
118 4 G.A.O. 2040.10 (1958).
117 4 G.A.O. 2060.10 (1958). See 28 Stat. 204 (1894), 31 U.S,C. 	 74 (1958).
118 4 G.A.O. 2065.10 (1958).
119 4 G.A.O. 2065.20 (1958).
120 See Ms. Comp. Gen. B-150173 (January II, 1963) (unpublished).
121
 Ibid. See H.R. Rep. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1954).
122 Ms. Comp. Gen. B-146102 (July 24, 1961) (unpublished) ; Ms. Comp. Gen.
B-142040 (April 2, 1962) (unpublished); Ms. Comp. Gen. B-142388 (May 24, 1960)
(unpublished).
123 Ms. Comp. Gen. B-150515 (July 1, 1963) (unpublished).
124 Ms. Comp. Gen. B-142950 (Oct. 13, 1960) (unpublished); .37 Decs. Comp.
Gen. 568 (1958); 38 Decs. Comp. Gen. 749 (1959).
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that the board decision was on a question of law, in which case the
board decision will not be considered to be binding on the Office.'
VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
If an administrative decision is adverse to a contractor, he may
seek judicial review of the decision either in a United States District
Court or in the Court of Claims. The jurisdiction of the district court
is limited by statute' to civil actions or claims against the United
States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount. The jurisdiction of the Court
of Claims is concurrent with that of the district courts up to $10,000,
and is exclusive for claims in excess of $10,000. 127
 Both have juris-
diction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States
founded either upon the Constitution, any Act of Congress, any reg-
ulation of an executive department, upon any express or implied
contract with the United States or for liquidated or unliquidated
damages' in cases not sounding in tort.'
ASBCA Jurisdiction
Backtracking slightly, the borders of the jurisdiction of the
ASBCA are sharply drawn; jurisdiction is limited to those matters
that arise out of government contracts or to appeals taken pursuant
to secretarial directive granting a right of appeal not contained in
the contract." When a claim is involved that is not cognizable under
the terms of the contract, the Board may make findings of fact with-
out expressing an opinion on the question of liability.' Although the
Court of Claims"' and the General Accounting Office132 have not con-
sidered such findings to be binding upon them, the Board frequently
will defer decisions on motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction un-
til there has been a hearing on both the merits and the motion.'"
However, where a rule or motion is filed prior to a hearing on the
merits, the Board may dismiss the appeal if it determines that it is
without authority to grant relief and no useful purpose would be
served by a hearing on the merits.' The Board has no equitable
125 34 Decs. Comp, Gen. 565 (1955).
120 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1958).
127 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1958).
128 Supra notes 126 and 127.
129 Preface to Rules of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 32 C.F.R.
§ 30.1, Part II (Supp, 1963).
1 " Ibid.; but see note 134 infra.
131 Miller, Inc. v. United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 252, 77 F. Supp. 209 (1948); Langevin
v. United States, 100 Ct. CI. 15, 31 (1943).
132 34 Decs. Comp. Gen. 20 (1954).
133 See ASBCA (Rule 5),•28 Fed. Reg. 9349 (1963),
134 Simmel-Industrie Mecanniche Societa per Azioni, A.S.B.C.A, No. 6141, 61-1
B.C.A. 11 2917 (1961); Norair Eng'r Corp., A.S.B.C.A. No. 3527, 57-1 B.C.A. f[ 1283
(1957).
129
t t t   i i     ti  f l , i  i  s  t
  i .'"
J  E I   I
  i i t ti  i i  i   t   tr t r,  
          i i
 
 t t te's° to civil actions or claims against t  
 t i  ,  in a ount. The jurisdiction of the Court
 i  clusive for claims in exce s of $10, 0.'" Both have j ris-
,    r i li
   li i t  r li i t
 
 i ti   t
'"   l i  i  i
  t  ti  f lia ility.'" lthough the
's' and the eneral cc ti  fficem  t -
!
 i . is fil  ri r t   
 3  ecs. , en. 565 (
128 2  .S.C. 	 6(a) (  (1
 28 .
	
128 S t .
125  l
, ou
35 . t see te 1  i
5  ill , c. . nited States, 111 Ct. Cl.  Sup  209 (1948); Langevin
. l
 . .  
5 l 1 .
1 i l stri  i  i i . . , , -
. . . If 2917 (1961); Norair E '  . , -  . . . if
.
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
authority, nor authority to rescind or reform a contract.' Unless the
contract authorizes administrative price adjustment, the ASBCA has
held that it has no authority to grant relief for damages for breach
of contract." Nor does the Board have jurisdiction to reform or to
grant unliquidated damages. 137 By statute, no government contract
can contain a provision making the decision of any administrative
board final on a question of law. 138 It appears to be anyone's guess
what the distinction is between questions of law and of fact, a subject
that is often discussed in administrative" and court"° decisions and
by commentators."' In recent years, however, efforts have been made
to bring as many disputed questions as possible within the purview
of the "disputes" clause, by providing in contract clauses, in effect,
that disputes arising under a given clause will be deemed a dispute
for the purposes of the "disputes" clause."'
The ASBCA may dispose of an appeal in one of several manners:
it may dismiss the appeal on the record, after all of the pleadings
are filed; it may render a decision making findings of fact and of law
on matters within its jurisdiction; or it may make findings of fact
without an opinion on liability after a hearing on the merits as to
questions outside the cognizance of the contract.
After dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter, without a hearing or finding of fact, the contractor has
exhausted his administrative remedies, and can try .the case de novo
in the Court of Claims, if he can state a case on which relief could
be granted. Where the Board hears an appeal and makes findings of
fact without expressing an opinion as to liability, the Court of Claims
. 135 Hyde Park Clothes, Inc. v. United States, 114 Ct. Cl. 424, 84 F. Supp. 589
(1949).
138 Roscoe Eng'r Corp. & Associates, A.S.B.C.A. No. 5370, 61-2 B.C.A. ¶ 3148 (1961);
Laburnum Constr, Corp., A.S.B.C.A. No. 5525, 59-2 B.C.A. ¶ 2309 (1959); George L.
Fuller Constr. Co., A.S.B.C.A. No. 5617, 59-2 B.C.A. 2411 (1959); Croft-Mullins
Elec. Co., A.S.B.C.A. No. 6113, 61-1 B.C.A. ¶ 2922 (1961); Larson-Ratio Constr. Co.,
A.S.B.C.A. No. 7468, 61-2 B.C.A. ¶ 3245 (1961).
137 Tulsa Army & Navy Store, A.S.B.C.A. No. 2192 (1954); Paul Tavetian,
A.S.B.C.A. No. 2429 (1954); Goodwin Novelty Co., A.S.B.C.A. No, 727 (1951).
138 Wunderlich Act, 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. § 322 (1958).
139 See, e.g., Rogers Constr. Co., A.S.B.C.A. No. 4125, 58-1 B.C.A. 	 1657 (1958);
Southland Co., A.S.B.C.A. No. 2078 (1956); Minneapolis-Moline Co., A.S.B.C.A. No.
1961 (1954); Blackwell Eng'r & Constr. Co., B.C.A. No. 370, 2 C.C.F. 713 (1944).
145 W. IL Edwards Eng'r Corp. v, United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 158, 168 F. Supp. 955
(1963) ; Guyler v. United States, 314 F.2d 506 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
141 Birnbaum, Questions of Law and Fact and the Jurisdiction of the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals, 19 Fed. B.J. 120 (1959). See also Louis L. Jaffe's
trilogy: Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 239 (1955) ; Judicial
Review: Question of Fact, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1020 (1956); Judicial Review: Constitu-
tional and Jurisdictional Fact, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 953 (1957).
142 E.g., Changes, ASPR, 32 C.F.R. §§ 7.103-2, 7.203-2 (1961); Inspection, ASPR,
32 C.F.R. §§ 7.103-5, 7.203-5 (1961); Default, ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 8.707 (Supp. 1963);
Termination for Convenience, ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 8.701 (1961).
130
 i  r r f r  a contract's' l  t
t liquidated damages." t tr t•
 fi al on a question of law.' It 
 i  ad inistrative's° and court"° decisi  
 f t e "disputes" clause."
  i  r fi i  f fact, the contractor has
 i  i istrative re edies, and can try 
, i    st te a case on hich relief could
33 yde Park Clothes, Inc. v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 424, 84 F. Supp. 589
2 6 Roscoe Eng'r Corp. & Associates, A.S.B.C.A. No. 5370, 61-2 B.C.A. g 3148 (1961);
, . . . . . 525, 59-2 B.C.A. 	
 t . ., .S.B.C.A. No. 5617, 59-2 B.C A 	 24 1 (1959); Croft- ll
ke. ., .S.B.C.A. No. 6113, 61-1 B.C.A. g ; rs t str. o.,
 , . . g  ( ).
37 Tulsa Ar y . . . .   
. . .  i  ovelty o., .S. . . . 727 ( ).
8 Wunderli ,  .  ( . 	 3 2 (1958).
3 See, e.g., ogers Constr. Co., A.S.B.C.A. No. 4125, 58-1 B.C.A. g 
l  ., . .  ( l . . 
l ll ' . ., . . . o. 370, 2 C.C.F. 713 (1944).
0 W H. ' . . , 144 t. l. 158, 168 F. up . 
; Guyler v. nite  t t ,  
141 , uestions of Law and Fact and the Juris i ti  f t e 
 tra t peals, 1  ed. B.J.  ( '
il : i i l i : i   ,  arv. L. Rev. 239 (1955) ; Judicial
 f Fact, 69 arv. L. Rev. 1020 (1956); Judicial i : stit -
 i i l ,  . . . 
. .  . -  ( ); Ins ti ,
44 . - , . -  ( ); f lt, ,  . . . § 8.707 (SUpp. 1963) ;
i ati n for Convenience, ASPR, 32 C.F.R. .  .
ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL APPEALS
will still consider the findings advisory.'" What has been less certain,
however, is the scope of review in cases that are heard and decided
on their merits by the Board, from which the contractor seeks review
in the Court of Claims.
The Bianchi Case
In United States v. Bianchi,'" the Supreme Court considered
the sole issue "whether, in a suit governed by [the Wunderlich Act],
the Court [of Claims] is restricted to a review of the administrative
record on issues of fact submitted to administrative determination
or is free to receive new evidence on such issues."'" The appeal
below questioned whether the contract cost was to be increased be-
cause of unforeseen conditions in rock through which the contractor
was to bore a 710-foot water diversion tunnel. These conditions
required installation of permanent supports throughout the full length
of the tunnel, rather than merely at the ends of the tunnel as pro-
vided in the contract specifications. Bianchi appealed the final deci-
sion of the contracting officer who had denied additional payment for
the permanent tunnel protection that was needed to complete work
under the contract. An adversary hearing was held before the Board
of Claims and Appeals of the Army Corps of Engineers, before which
a record was made, evidence introduced and four witnesses for
Bianchi examined and cross-examined. The Board's decision was ad-
verse to the contractor. Nearly six years after the Board's decision,
Bianchi brought an action for breach of contract in the Court of
Claims, seeking damages and alleging that the decisions of both the
contracting officer and the Board were "capricious or arbitrary or
so grossly erroneous . as necessarily to imply bad faith, or were not
supported by substantial evidence." A Commissioner of the Court,
over government objection, received evidence de novo, including ev-
idence that had not been before the Board. The Court of Claims con-
cluded that "on consideration of all the evidence, the contracting
officer's decision cannot be said to have substantial support."'" It
adhered to its decision in Valentine & Littleton v. United States,'
the first Court of Claims case holding that the trial in the Court of
Claims should not be limited to the record made before the contract-
ing agency, but should be de novo. The Supreme Court concluded that
[A]part from questions of fraud, determination of the fi-
nality to be attached to a departmental decision on a ques-
143 See cases cited in note 131, supra.
144 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
14s Id. at 710.
146 144 Ct. Cl. 500, 506, 169 F. Supp. 514 (1959).
147 136 Ct. Cl. 638, 145 F. Supp. 952 (1956).
131
i  
 v. i c i,'"  Supre e rt 
'"
 t  i rsi  t el. hese conditions
ssly e roneous as necessarily t  i l   f it ,  
 
i  t be said to have substantial sup ort."4° It
ol  it leton v. United State '
3 Se  
4 373 U.S. 709 (1
5 .
3 144 Ct. Cl. 500, 506,  . . 51  (
97 136 Ct. CI. 638, 145 F. Supp. 952 (1 )
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
tion arising under a "disputes" clause must rest solely on
consideration of the record before the department's
The question of fraud was not before the Court in Bianchi, the
Court saying that such questions "normally require the receipt of
evidence outside the administrative record 'for their resolution. . . ." 149
The Court's interpretation of the term "substantial evidence" de-
scribes the basis, the standard, upon which administrative records
are to be judged by reviewing courts.
This standard goes to the reasonableness of what the agency •
did on the basis o•the evidence before it, for a decision may
be supported by substantial evidence even though it could
be refuted by other evidence that was not presented to the
decision-making body."' [Emphasis in original.]
The Court noted that the standards of review adopted in the
Wunderlich Act had been frequently used by Congress, and associated
with review limited to administrative records."' The Court, in inter-
preting those Acts of Congress, has confined review to administrative
records.162
 Using the Court's dictum, it would appear that in deter-
mining whether legal error was committed by the administrative
board, the reviewing court must determine, "on the basis of the ev-
idence before it," whether the board properly adjudicated the appeal
without acting capriciously or unreasonably, and whether the ev-
idence on which the determination was based was substantial. The
House Judiciary Committee, as noted previously, adopted the interpre-
tation of "substantial evidence" set forth by the Supreme Court in Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,'" wherein the term was defined as
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion."'" A court or administrative board must render
148 United States v. Bianchi, supra note 144, at 714.
143 Ibid.
1bo Id. at 715.
151
 Ibid., citing Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
§ 1009 (1958); Fair Labor Standards Act § 10, .52 Stat. 1065 (1955), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 210 (1958) ; National Labor Relations Act § 10, 49 Stat. 453 (1936), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1959). Other Acts include: Federal Trade Commission Act,
38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1958) ; Indian Claims Commission
Act, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946), 25 U.S.C. §§ 70-70v (1958), as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 70s, 70v
(Supp. IV, 1959-62). Where Congress intended a de novo review, it has so stated
expressly: Renegotiation Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 21, as amended, 50 App. U.S.C. § 1218
(Supp. IV, 1959-62); Soil Bank Act, 70 Stat. 191 (1956), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 1831
(Supp. IV, 1959-62).
182 Ibid., citing National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227
(1943); Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930). Other cases
include: O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1951); Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 230 (1938); FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927).
153
 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
154 Id. at 229.
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a decision making a choice of possible interpretations. In exercising
that choice in review of administrative decisions, according to Bianchi,
the issue is whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support
the choice or determination, not whether additional evidence might be
introduced on review that was not considered below and which might
produce an opposite result.
VII. COMMENTARY
The Court has obviously moved to strengthen, or to encourage
the strengthening, of the administrative appellate process for han-
dling contract disputes. However, the Court, by the limited scope of
its grant of certiorari in Bianchi, left open many problems, some of
which may require further resolution by the Court.
It would be unusual, indeed, if the Court of Claims were to give a
broad construction to the Bianchi decision. In fact, it has, since
Bianchi, indicated that it will narrowly construe any limitation upon
its practice. In cases already tried, but not decided prior to Bianchi,
the Court of Claims will continue to consider the de novo evidence
introduced if the government did not object to introduction of that
evidence in a timely manner. In Stein Bros. Mfg. Co. v. United
States,165
 the Court of Claims so held, reasoning that the problem
stated by Bianchi is "evidential or procedural, not jurisdictional,"
and may be waived.
.. [The Wunderlich Act] is legislation governing suits by
as well as against the United States and therefore more
akin to a nonjurisdictional rule of procedural or substantive
law which can usually be adduced or abandoned as the lit-
igant sees fit.'"
Situations similar to those in Stein Bros. will be relatively
easy to decide, the decision hinging upon the procedural action of the
government to preserve its objection to the receipt of de novo evi-
dence. However, because of divergent interpretations of the effect of
the Bianchi case, one can expect controversy to arise shortly over
the binding effect of administrative findings of fact in cases where
it is determined that administrative tribunals do not have authority
to determine liability. When it is determined that an administrative
board has no jurisdiction to render an opinion as to liability, but the
board has made findings of fact, the Court of Claims will probably
continue to treat those findings as being merely advisory and not
binding as to finality.'" The contrary view, formally presented to the
155 32 U.S.L. Week 2050 (Ct. Cl. July 12, 1963).
156 Stein Bros. Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra note 155, at 2050.
157 See cases cited in note 131, supra.
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Court of Claims by the Department of Justice, is that in any claim
arising under a contract or incident to the performance of a govern-
ment contract falls within the "disputes" clause, and all disputed ques-
tions of fact must be determined by the administrative tribunal or
officer having authority to make final decisions. Under this position,
no new evidentiary matter would be taken, on judicial review, in
any lawsuit involving a contract that contains a disputes clause, in-
cluding suits for breach of contract, reformation, rescission, unliquid-
ated damages and any other suit in which it has previously been
held that administrative tribunals do not have authority to render an
opinion as to liability. This position leaves open the question of the
desirability of having the parties go to one tribunal to try the facts
and to another to decide the issues of law. If it is deemed desirable to
have administrative tribunals be the triers of fact in all cases arising
out of or incident to government contracts, then changes in the "dis-
putes" clause to make this intention explicit should follow. Further,
if that position were to be followed, it is all the more desirable that
administrative tribunals be given a subpoena power.
In Bianchi, the Supreme Court noted that to the extent that the
administrative record is insubstantially supported, the Court of Claims
could stay its own proceedings pending further action before the
agency involved. If the agency refused or failed to take further action
to remedy a substantive or procedural defect or inadequacy, the lower
court might impose the sanction of judgment for the contractor, de-
spite the insubstantial record.
Such a stay would certainly be justified where the depart-
ment had failed to make adequate provision for a record
that could be subjected to judicial scrutiny, for it was clearly
part of the legislative purpose to achieve uniformity in this
respect.'"
The Court of Claims stated in Stein Bros. that "it may very well
be" that in cases involving the interpretation of contract specifica-
tions [or other issues that are considered to be issues of law and not
of fact] that that court is
not precluded by the Bianchi decision or the Wunderlich
Act (41 U.S.C. §§ 321-322) from considering any evidence
bearing on that legal issue, no matter what the Board of
Contract Appeals determined or whit was in the record
before it. 16"
158 United States v. Bianchi, supra note 144, at 718.
155 Stein Bros. Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra note 155. [Ed. note. This quotation
was not printed as part of the condensed case report appearing in 32 U.S.L. Week
2050 (1963).] See also WPC Enterprises, Ct. Cl. No. 256-59 (Oct. 11, 1963).
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Later in the same case, the Court of Claims determined that it would
try the damage issues where the administrative agency had not reached
or passed upon that phase of the case. 16° There will be some cases
in which Court of Claims action is stayed while the parties return
to the department or agency for further substantive or procedural
action. In those cases the departments or agencies may have to take
action to remedy the defect or inadequacy, even in cases in which, in
the past, they have declined to do so because they lacked authority
to render an opinion on liability. This they may do in the belief that
if they fail to act, judgment may be entered for the contractor based
upon the record as it stands.
Indications are that the Supreme Court will, at some time, be
asked to clarify its intent in the Bianchi case as further controver-
sies arise. However in the meantime it can reasonably be expected
that the Court of Claims will continue to construe the Bianchi case
narrowly, resolving questions whenever possible in favor of its tak-
ing evidence de novo in their review of contract appeals.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While the aggrieved contractor will have an administrative rem-
edy in filing a claim in the General Accounting Office, it is now the
general practice of that Office to permit action by the agency. involved,
to the extent that there is a dispute under the "disputes" clause,
before it will render a decision on the claim. Inde6d, if the
contractor wishes judicial review of his claim, he will have to exhaust
his administrative remedies under the "disputes" clause. These require-
ments, plus the continuing state of flux and problems raised by
Bianchi, make it perhaps appropriate to raise some questions about
the disputes procedures before administrative tribunals.
When he wrote for the Court of Claims in Valentine & Little-
ton, Judge J. Warren Madden forcefully pointed out many weak-
nesses of administrative boards. Many of these have been cured by
some of the boards, but many problems still exist and warrant cor-
rection. The work of the Administrative Conference of the United
States was most notable in its studies and recommendations to the
President for improvement of administrative procedures.' Further
1" Ibid. The Court of Claims cited the following cases, inter alia, as authority
for courts to make determinations of damages in cases in which administrative authorities
have failed or refused to determine a dispute: Brister & Koester Lumber Corp. v. United
States, 188 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Maxon Dress Corp. v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl.
434, 442, 115 F. Supp. 439 (1953) ; United States Cas. Co. v. United States, 107 Ct.
Cl. 46, 68, 67 F. Supp. 950 (1946); Manufacturers' Cas. Ins. Co. v. United States, 105
Ct. Cl. 342, 351, 63 F. Supp. 759 (1946); Cape Ann Granite Co. v. United States,
100 Ct. Cl. 53, 71 (1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 790 (1944).
1431 See Final Report of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Sum-
mary of Activities of the Conference, December 15, 1962.
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studies are being conducted by the Bureau of the Budget on an
agency by agency basis seeking means by which improvements can
be instituted.
One suggested improvement is the appointment of a single,
central board of contract appeals, drawing its members from men
experienced in the manifold problems of government procurement.
While some objection will be voiced to the creation of another tribunal
that would, in effect, be an administrative court, do we not now have
a proliferation of such tribunals, each with its own rules and modus
operandi, not to mention those agencies that have no formal pro-
cedures for handling contract disputes?
Another notable weakness under the present system is the lack of
an effective subpoena power. As a general practice, all the informa-
tion necessary to prepare and properly present an appeal can be ob-
tained in prehearing conferences and by written or oral interrogatories.
But occasionally the only means by which a party can discover certain
information is by subpoena. While the decision did not hinge on
them, two significant findings were, made in the Stein Bros. Mfg. Co.
case, which were the result of a subpoena issued by the Court of
Claims, and which were not made available to the administrative
board that previously decided the case. Strong and liberal discovery
might strengthen our contract appeals procedures.
The purposes of administrative procedures for handling contract
disputes are thwarted in part when decisions are not rendered ex-
peditiously. Part of the delay is attributable to requiring more than one
man to decide a case, imposing unnecessary layers of review upon
the decision-making process. Procedures such as those adopted by the
Atomic Energy Commission might well be more universally adopted.
Another important delay factor is that frequently a case is not
ready for decision once the hearing is completed, because the case
has not been briefed prior to the hearing. There is little reason, except
when new, unanticipated facts are disclosed in the hearing, why the
board should not have trial briefs in advance of the hearing and be pre-
pared to render a decision immediately after the hearing. Chief Jus-
tice Vanderbilt, of New Jersey, spoke directly to this problem:
With pretrial procedures to get at the facts, with a pretrial
conference to limit the trial to the real points in controversy,
and with trial briefs, where necessary, made available to the
court in advance of trial, there is no reason why in nonjury
cases the trial judge, having studied the trial briefs and hav-
ing heard the evidence and having listened to the closing argu-
ments of counsel, should not be in a position to decide the case
at once. He will never know more about it than he does at
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that time. The moment for decision has arrived, before other
cases intervene to dull and blur his grasp of the pending case.
The further the judge gets away from the trial and the
more matters intervene, the more elusive will the facts and
the "feel" of a given case become.'"
The attitudes of the parties to the administrative handling of
contract disputes will influence, as much as anything else, the effec-
tiveness of the proceedings. With full co-operation from the parties,
administrative tribunals are generally able to make decisions relatively
expeditiously. The competence and experience of most members of
administrative tribunals is ample reason for aggrieved contractors to
repose their confidence in the boards and to ensure that there is a
full disclosure of the facts and of the law. Not the least of the ad-
vantages of these administrative proceedings is that by subjecting the
dispute to the formality and scrutiny of pleadings and hearings, often
the first clear definition of the issues is made, which frequently leads
to settlement of the dispute. While Judge Madden, who wrote the
Court of Claims' decisions in Wunderlich, Volentine & Littleton and
Bianchi, would eliminate the finality of departmental decisions on both
the parties and the courts, and would make departmental proceedings
a continuation of the negotiations between the parties,'° 3 the plain
fact is that administrative decisions of contract appeals achieve their
intended purposes in an overwhelming majority of cases, and ad-
ministrative tribunals are appropriate and respected forums for con-
sideration and final determination of contract appeals. Since dispute
procedures generally presuppose a breakdown of negotiations, little
will be gained by considering contract appeals as an extension of
negotiations, without binding effect upon the parties or the courts.
The finality of administrative decisions is a reasonable concomitant of
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, and where
weaknesses exist in the administrative process the solution more surely
lies in reform and strengthening of those procedures than in their
elimination.
162 Vanderbilt, The Challenge of Law Reform, 79-80 (1955). See also, Sass, A
Government Lawyer Looks at the Contract Appeal System, 8 Cath. U.L. Rev. 23 (1959).
163 "Bianchi's Ghost" speech of Judge J. Warren Madden to the Division of Public
Contracts, Administrative Law Section, American Bar Association, August 11, 1963,
Chicago, Illinois.
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